We study sequential message-sending games with an uninformed decision maker and multiple self-interested informed agents in which the ability to prove claims is limited. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of robust inference rules -that is, rules which lead to full, correct inferences even if the decision maker has very little information about speakers' preferences or strategies. Surprisingly little provability is need when the decision maker only knows that the speakers have conflicting preferences over his actions. Conflicting preferences guarantees that someone will have an incentive to "correct" any mistaken inference. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82.
I. Introduction.
Numerous economic, political and legal activities involve efforts by one or more self-interested parties to persuade uncommitted decision makers to take certain actions. Managers issue audited earnings reports to shareholders. Lobbyists brief legislators about pending bills. Litigants hire experts to testify on the facts of a case. Conversely, decision makers typically try to maximize the information elicited from such communication recognizing, of course, the possibility of bias due to the speakers' self-interest. Indeed, what an interested party wants the decision maker to do (e.g., retain incumbent management, vote for a bill, etc.) is often independent of the variables of interest to the decision maker (e.g., managerial quality, the bill's merits, etc.). In some situations the decision maker may not even know a priori exactly what the speakers' preferences are.
Certainly, statements which include irrefutable proof of some fact have information content regardless of the speaker's preferences. Unfortunately, how much is explicitly provable is often limited. That is, an interested party may be able to prove only some -but not all -of what he knows. We call this partial provability. Limitations on the ability to prove claims arise from at least two sources. First, there may be limitations on the number of facts speakers can disclose.
In political debates, for example, time constraints may limit information transmission if voters are unable to absorb more than a certain amount of information in the time available. Second, definitive proof of some true facts simply may not exist or speakers may not be allowed to provide it. For example, while a pianist can easily demonstrate that he can play the piano, it is hard to imagine how a non-musician could prove that he cannot.
1 Alternatively, the exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction in trials of evidence (factual "proofs" which prosecutors do have) obtained through illegal searches.
Economic theory, in view of the perceived pervasiveness of limits on provability, has largely focused on information revelation through observation of actions and/or outcomes as opposed to written or verbal communication. 2 In contrast, we are interested solely in such direct communication. We show that full revelation of all information of interest to the decision maker does not always require speakers to prove all facts known to them. Rather, the "burden of proof" may be much weaker in that it involves proving only certain key facts. Of course, which facts are key depends on what the speakers' preferences are -that is, on which "lies" speakers would like to tell.
We focus here on the important case of conflicting preferences where the interested parties disagree among themselves about the relative desirability of possible actions by the decision maker.
Examples include corporate proxy battles, rival advertising campaigns, dispute mediation, and 1 congressional hearings. In such situations we show that the associated burden of proof for full revelation is surprisingly weak. Moreover, the decision maker's inferences are robust in the sense that they require very little knowledge about the speakers' preferences or strategies.
Thus it is important to include direct communication in economic models because even minimal provability may radically affect predicted outcomes. The following example illustrates this point.
Example 1.
Suppose there are a large number of possible "states of nature" -say 1000 -and that in each state the decision maker (if he knew the true state) would take a different action.
Initially the decision maker is uninformed, but he receives advice from two lobbyists who each know the true state. He knows that the lobbyists disagree about the relative desirability of any pair of possible actions, but nothing else. Lobbyist 1 speaks first followed by lobbyist 2 who speaks after seeing 1's message. The available messages allow a lobbyist (a) to assert unverifiably that a particular state s is true (even if it is not) and then (b) to submit a single piece of evidence ruling out any single untrue state s . A state cannot be ruled out if it is actually true. We call these "not" messages since they unambiguously prove only that a single s is not the true state. Thus, a "not" message is the minimally informative message in terms of what it explicitly proves.
Taken together the lobbyists' two messages rule out at most only two of the thousand states directly. However, despite the limited informativeness of "not" messages, there is an inference rule which supports a perfectly revealing equilibrium! It is simply to believe lobbyist 1's assertion unless it is disproven by lobbyist 2. In this case, believe lobbyist 2's assertion, so long as it is not disproven by either of the two messages. Clearly lobbyist 2, if he can disprove 1's assertion, will do so. Furthermore, since he will make the best possible assertion for himself, the conflict between his preferences and those of lobbyist 1 guarantees that this is the worst possible assertion for lobbyist 1 . Hence in equilibrium lobbyist 1 will tell the truth (except possibly in his least preferred state where lying and getting caught does not affect the final outcome).
Intuitively, complete revelation is possible because 2's message conveys more in equilibrium than simply ruling out a single state. The failure of 2 to "refute" 1's claim is taken as evidence of the inability to refute. More generally, an interested party's failure to prove certain facts may be construed to mean that these facts are untrue. While this also occurs in models with only one speaker, this example suggests that the potential informational gain with multiple speakers is substantial. This is because the interpretation of a message from one speaker can now depend on what other speakers say. 3 Thus the equilibrium interpretation of a "not state s " message from lobbyist 2 changes dramatically depending on whether 1 initially claimed state s or not.
Games with communication and no provability have been widely studied in the signaling and mechanism design literature. In this literature, agents have different preferences depending on their private information. In signaling models, these preference differences may take the form of differential "signaling costs" as in [19] . Alternatively, the speaker's preferences may vary with his information in manner similar to that of the hearer as in [3] . In the mechanism design or implementation literature (see [11, 12, 15, 17] ), a "social planner" uses differences in preferences across states to get informed agents to reveal their information truthfully. As discussed above, part of our interest is in settings where the speaker's preferences are independent of his private information and/or unknown to the decision maker.
The study of games with provability 4 is relatively new. [9, 13, 14] study signaling in the special case of complete provability -that is, when an interested party can prove any true claim. Their insight is that a decision maker, by adopting an attitude of "scepticism in the face of vagueness,"
can force complete disclosure of all information in equilibrium. As a practical matter, however, this approach has two weaknesses. First, it makes strong assumptions about the set of available messages. In particular, to prove the full truth unambiguously may require exhaustive specificity in some proofs. Second, it cannot explain the prevalence of adversarial debate among multiple parties in many real-world decision-making processes (e.g., labor mediation, trials, congressional hearings).
In particular, with complete provability and symmetrically informed speakers, all information can be elicited from a single speaker. Thus there is no informational gain from competition between multiple interested parties.
The idea of partial provability first appeared in [13] . The attraction of this idea is that, while interested parties may be unable to prove much, it is often unrealistic to assume that they can prove nothing. The complication partial provability introduces is that some vagueness (i.e., incompleteness in proof) is unavoidable. The key insight is that these limitations can often be overcome because in equilibrium the failure to prove certain key supporting facts may be construed as evidence that certain claims are untrue, as in Example 1. The subsequent literature on partial provability is still small. [6, 18] , like [13] , consider the case of a single interested party in the context of particular message structures. [16] considers multiple asymmetrically informed interested parties with a specialized message structure. However, their assumptions effectively decompose the game into a collection of parallel single interested party problems. Finally, in quite a different vein, [8] considers the role of partial provability in a principal-agent context.
In this article, we study communication in a large class of games in which interested parties speak sequentially. Our focus is on the following question. How much provability is required to achieve full and robust revelation in such games? We say that the decision maker's inference rule is 3 robust for a set P of possible speaker preferences if it leads to correct inference given any equilibrium responses by the speakers to this rule and for every profile of speaker preferences in P. We find that a simple condition on the structure of provability, which we call refutability, is sufficient for robust full revelation when the speakers have conflicting preferences over the decision maker's action. We also provide a necessary and sufficient condition called weak refutability for robust full revelation in open forums -games where each speaker only speaks once. As in Example 1, a simple inference rule supports robust revelation. It is to provisionally believe claims unless they are subsequently refuted. However, in general the burden of proof for claims to be put "on the table" is more subtle than in Example 1. In particular, claims must be made in such a way that they can later be disproven if they are false. Refutability or weak refutability simply ensure enough provability to met this burden in each state. Either refutability condition is weaker than complete provability or any of the particular forms of partial provability considered in the previous literature.
This article is organized as follows. Section II presents the basic model. Section III presents sufficient conditions for robust revelation in the special case of an open forum. Section IV extends this analysis to general sequential games. In Section V, we discuss some related issues. Concluding remarks are offered in Section VI.
II. The Model.
We have n + 1 players, n "senders" of information and one "receiver." Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of senders. The senders send messages to the receiver, who then chooses an action affecting both his own utility and the utility of each sender. The senders are symmetrically informed with information which is not known to the receiver, but which affects the receiver's payoff and possibly their own. Messages have no effect on any player's utility except through any influence they exert on the decision maker's action. 5 Thus the sending of costless messages can be interpreted as the senders' attempts to persuade the receiver to choose actions they like.
Let S denote the set of possible states of the world. A given state s ∈ S specifies all facts known to the senders which affect the receiver's payoff. 6 For example, a state might specify the circumstances of a crime, the relative merits of various brands of a good, the talent of a firm's incumbent management, or the costs and benefits of various health care reform proposals. For simplicity, S is taken to be finite. The number of states is L.
Messages sent to the receiver can include evidence such as documents or physical items. Thus a state s also specifies the availability of such evidence. Thus, even a message which is in every M (s) -and which hence has no pure information content whatsoever -can still have significant equilibrium information content.
To avoid trivial barriers to communication (e.g., fewer messages than states), we assume throughout a rich language condition. Intuitively, the language is sufficiently rich so that a sender can always include in his message a "cheap talk" claim of any state that the message does not The receiver's payoff depends on both his action and on the true state s ∈ S. Given the messages sent, the receiver updates his beliefs and then chooses an action to maximize his expected utility. 9 The receiver's posterior beliefs are an inference δ ∈ ∆ where ∆ is the set of probability distributions over S. His prior is some δ 0 ∈ ∆, where δ 0 (s) > 0 for all s ∈ S. When there is little risk of confusion, we will also use s to denote the probability distribution which puts probability 1 on state s. Such a probability distribution is called a degenerate inference.
In each state s, each sender i has preferences over the possible actions by the receiver. These in turn induce preferences over possible inferences by the receiver. In other words, sender i prefers the inference δ to δ in state s if, knowing s is the true state, he prefers the action the receiver takes given inference δ to the action taken given inference δ . 10 Formally, the preference ordering of sender i in state s is a complete, reflexive, and transitive ordering i,s over the set ∆. Let
s preferences in different states and let = ( 1 , . . . , n ) denote a preference profile across all n senders. It is important to note though that we do not exclude the possibility that a sender's preferences are independent of the true state, s.
We study a large class of finite extensive form games, which we call sequential games, in which senders never speak simultaneously. That is, every information set for every sender is a singleton.
Whenever it is his turn to speak, a sender first observes the sequence of messages from previous senders and then chooses any one (feasible) message to send to the receiver. The sequence of senders may be either fixed or endogenously determined by the messages sent. Of particular interest are two special cases. The first is a type of sequential game we call an open forum in which each sender has exactly one turn to speak. The second, a balanced sequential game, generalizes the open forum to games in which each sender has at least one turn to speak.
The assumption of only one message per turn is typically restrictive given the message sets and the number of rounds of message sending in the sense that it limits how much can be proven. Indeed, the inability to communicate all feasible messages is an important form of partial provability in practice. However, the one-message-per-turn assumption in no way restricts the class of sequential games studied here. For example, a sequential game in which, say, two messages are sent per turn is equivalent to one in which each speaker has two successive turns to send one message. Even holding fixed the number of rounds, the two-messages-per-turn game can be recast as a one-message-perturn game by redefining the message sets and letting each speaker send one message from redefined
We now define sequential games more precisely. For simplicity, we assume the number of rounds of message sending is some fixed K independent of the messages sent. Let
be the set of sequences of exactly k messages feasible in state s. Let h 0 denote the initial (empty) history when the game begins (and no messages have been sent) and let H 0 (s) = {h 0 } for all s.
be the set of possible histories of up to K feasible messages in state s and let
denote the set of all possible feasible histories. Given two histories h, h ∈ H K , let h · h denote the sequence of messages in h followed by those in h . Given a history h ∈ H K , we say that Unlike the senders, the receiver does not observe the state itself, but only the messages sent.
The set of possible histories he can observe in a game with K rounds of messages is
K .
An inference rule for the receiver is a function δ : Our equilibrium notion is essentially perfect Bayesian equilibrium ( [7] ). An equilibrium of (K, I) given a preference profile is a pair (σ, δ) consisting of a vector of sender strategies σ and an inference rule δ for the receiver satisfying the following. First, for each state s and history h, every sender i's strategy is optimal given the other senders' strategies and the receiver's inference
Second, the receiver updates his beliefs using Bayes' Rule whenever the final history has nonzero probability under the strategies σ. Thus, if a history h ∈ H R is on the equilibrium path in the
Third, off the equilibrium path (i.e., when S * (h, σ) is empty), inferences only need to be consistent with feasibility in that δ(h)(s) = 0 for any state s not in F (h) (i.e., for states explicitly disproven by some message m in h).
Our focus here is on separating equilibria.
Definition. A separating equilibrium of a game (K, I) given is an equilibrium (σ, δ) in which
δ(h R (σ s )) = s for all s so that the receiver always learns the true state. 7
As in [14] , we are interested in situations where the receiver has very little information about the senders. In particular, we seek inference rules which are "robust" in the sense that the receiver can use them and be sure, given only minimal information about the preference profile and equilibrium strategies of the senders, that his inference is correct.
To see the intuition, fix a sequential game (K, I), a preference profile , and an equilibrium (σ, δ). In each state s, the senders in effect play a game among themselves. Since (σ, δ) is an equilibrium, from (1) Suppose that for some s in some equilibrium of the induced gameσ s = σ s , the receiver infers incorrectly given δ. For the receiver to know whether his inferences are correct, then, he must know which strategies in E(δ, s, K, I, ) the senders are playing. However, if his inferences are correct for all equilibria in the induced game for each s, then he does not have this problem. Moreover, suppose that, given a different preference profile, there would then be an equilibriumσ s in the induced game leading him to infer incorrectly. Then the receiver must be sure of the preference profile to know that his inferences are correct. A robust inference rule is precisely one which avoids these two problems.
Definition. Given a sequential game (K, I) and a set of preference profiles P, δ is a robust inference rule for P if for every ∈ P, there is a σ such that (σ, δ) is an equilibrium and if for every s and σ
More intuitively, if the receiver has a robust inference rule for P, then he can know that, whatever the actual preference profile is -as long as it is in P -and whatever equilibrium is played in the induced games among the senders, his inferences will be correct.
An obvious but useful fact about robust inference rules is the following. Suppose P ⊂ P .
Then if δ is robust for P , it must be robust for P. Hence any condition which is sufficient for the existence of a robust inference rule for P is also sufficient for P, while any condition which is necessary for the existence of a robust rule for P is also necessary for P . For this reason, we state our necessary conditions for "small" P sets and our sufficient conditions for "large" sets.
Robust inference for the set of all preference profiles is not possible in general, even with complete provability. Consequently, the receiver must have some prior information about the senders' preferences for a robust inference rule to exist. We focus here on the case of conflicting preferences since, as noted above, adversarial debate among competing interested parties is an important feature of many real-world decision processes. Let P * denote the set of conflicting preference profiles and let P * I denote the set of state independent conflicting preference profiles. Robust inference for classes of preferences as large as P * or P * I is clearly still a strong property. It cannot exploit differences in preferences across particular individuals (since they are not known) or across states (since there may be none). In particular (and unlike the analysis of complete provability), the trick of "punishing" a sender for sending unhelpful (i.e., vague or otherwise incomplete) messages is not available (i.e., since the decision maker does not know which of the feasible state the sender prefers least). We show in the next two sections that unexpectedly weak conditions are nonetheless sufficient for robust inference in sequential games.
Readers familiar with the literature on full implementation may find a comparison useful. In this literature (see [12, 15, 17] ), one seeks a game form, say (M, O), which fully implements a social choice correspondence. More precisely, M = i M i where M i is the message set for agent i. O is an outcome function, mapping M into some outcome space. The agents all have preferences over outcomes where these preferences depend on the state of the world. A social choice correspondence is fully implemented by this game form if, for each state, the set of equilibrium outcomes equals the social choice set for the state. By contrast, in our model the set of feasible messages (but not necessarily preferences) vary with the state. Our notion of robust inference is similar to the notionof full implementation. With robust inference, given a state and the inference rule, all equilibria for any preference profile in the class have the same outcome. With full implementation, all equilibria given any preference profile are "acceptable" in the sense that their outcomes satisfy the social choice rule. In our model, however, the receiver is also a player in the game and cannot commit himself to choosing suboptimally (e.g., taking an action which is optimal only in a state which was explicitly ruled out in the course of play). In the full implementation literature, the only "receiver" is the mythical social planner who can commit to any (feasible) outcome out of equilibrium.
III. Sufficient Conditions for Robust Inference in an Open Forum.
In this section we give a simple condition on the structure of provability -as represented by the message sets M (s) -that is sufficient for robust inference for P * in an open forum. This condition, in particular, is weaker than either complete provability or the forms of partial provability used in the previous literature.
While this analysis is a special case of results for sequential games in the next section, the simpler structure of an open forum allows us to present the underlying intuition more directly.
Recall that an open forum is a sequential game (n, I) in which each sender has one and only one turn to send a single message. In other words, every final history h ∈ H R has exactly one subhistory
A key to our results is the robustness of a very simple and plausible type of inference rule which we call a believe-unless-refuted (or BUR) rule. Intuitively, with a BUR rule the receiver provisionally believes any claim satisfying a certain burden of proof unless it is explicitly refuted by a subsequent sender.
Definition. The inference rule δ in a K round game is a believe-unless-refuted rule if for every s and every history
With a BUR rule, it may be that only certain messages m s,h ∈ M (s) can be used to claim s off. This, however, contradicts σ s being an equilibrium. Thus, no equilibrium in the induced game leads to a false inference. However, the induced game, being a finite game of perfect information, does have a pure strategy equilibrium. 13 Since the receiver must infer correctly in every such equilibrium, the inference rule is robust.
How much provability is needed for a BUR rule to exist? As noted above, they do not exist in games in which nothing is provable. At the other extreme, they exist trivially if everything is provable -in which case, for each s there is a message which explicity disproves every other state which can play the role of m s,h in a BUR rule. The interesting question then is just how little provability is needed.
We begin by first defining complete provability. Strictly speaking, this could mean that literally every true statement is provable. That is, for every setŜ ⊆ S, there is a message mŜ such that F (mŜ) =Ŝ. However, we will define complete provability as a weaker property, namely that for every s ∈ S, there is a message m s which proves s -that is, F (m s ) = {s}. We use this weaker definition because it is the key to the separation proofs in [9, 13] . Complete provability, as defined here, is shown below to consist of two components. First, it requires two-way disprovability -that is,
This means that, whenever s is true, a message m ∈ M (s) \M (s ) is available disproving s and vice versa. Thus two-way disprovability is a natural generalization of the "not" messages considered in Example 1. When relaxing this condition, we will generally wish to maintain a weaker condition called one-way disprovability:
One 
Clearly, two-way disprovability and the full reports condition are each quite strong. As in the piano player example of the introduction, there are many situations where it is not possible to prove some fact which is true. As a more economic example, it may be difficult for an agent to prove that he has no private information of use to the receiver, as in [18] . In such situations, two-way disprovability does not hold. If complete proof requires more time or space than is available, then the full reports condition does not hold. Candidate debates are a natural example. Previous models of partial provability relax one but not both of these assumptions in very specific ways. Thus the "any-k-signals" structure of [6, 13] 14 satisfies two-way disprovability but not the full reports condition. The "not-less-than" message structure of [16] 15 satisfies the full reports condition and one-way disprovability but not two-way disprovability, as does the message structure studied by [18] . 16 We now show that a much weaker condition than either two-way disprovability or full reports plus one-way disprovability is sufficient for existence of a BUR rule. To state it, we first define a set S * (s) = {s = s | M (s ) ⊆ M (s)} which we use to define
Definition. The message sets satisfy refutability if for every s and every s / ∈ S * (s ), we have
To understand refutability, recall that the rich language condition allows us to interpret messages as including a cheap-talk (i.e., "proof-less") claim of a state. However, the interpretation of messages is part of the receiver's inference rule, so he is free to choose how he associates claims with messages. Hence he need not interpret every message in M (s) as a claim of s, but rather only ones which meet some burden of proof in that they explicity rule out (i.e., disprove) certain "problem states."
For a BUR rule, the problematic states for a claim s are those in the set S * (s). To see why, Our next result confirms that refutablity does indeed ensure enough provability for BUR rules to exist.
Proposition 3. A degenerate BUR rule exists if the message sets satisfy refutability.
Intuitively, suppose that the first sender puts a state s "on the table" using a message in T (s). His claim then stays on the table until refuted by some subsequent sender using a message m ∈ T (s )\M (s) to make a new trustworthy claim s . The game then continues in this fashion with whatever claim is left on the table after the last speaker's turn being the receiver's final inference.
Refutability guarantees that senders can always replace any false trustworthy claim on the table at their turn with a trustworthy claim of the true state and know that their claim cannot itself be subsequently replaced by yet another claim. 13
Summarizing then, refutability is sufficient for the existence of a degenerate BUR rule and hence for robust inference for P * (or for any subset like P * I ) in an open forum. In equilibrium, the receiver is able to make an inference of s and be confident that it is true -even though typically he will not have seen conclusive proof to this effect (i.e., F (h) = {s}). He can do this because refutability allows him to establish trustworthiness as a burden of proof for making claims. This in turn guarantees that if his inference were to be incorrect, each sender would be able to correct him. Finally, conflicting preferences guarantees that at least one sender has an incentive to do so. Example 2. Trials provide a particularly nice illustration of our model. In Figure 2 , the accused is guilty in state s 2 (in which he was videotaped leaving the scene of the crime) and innocent in states s 1 (in which he was far away walking alone in the woods) and s 3 (in which he was also videotaped, but a passerby saw someone else commit the crime). 17 Full reports are usually possible at trials (since each side is free to submit any and all material evidence they wish), but two-way disprovabiilty may fail, as in this example. In this case, m 1 is simply "proof-less" testimony from the accused that he was "alone in the woods." Message m 2 is the videotape while m 3 is the videotape together with testimony from the passerby. Suppose the prosecutor speaks first and then the defense. Then there is a BUR rule which has a natural interpretation as "innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." If the prosecutor's case consists only of the message m 1 , he has proven nothing. Under this rule, the inference is innocence, which can be interpretted as "innocent until proven guilty." If the prosecutor's case consists of m 2 , then the BUR rule requires a verdict of guilt unless the defense presents m 3 . Note that m 2 does not prove guilt, only guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt" in the sense that if the accused is innocent, he can establish this. The jury relies on conflicting preferences (given our adversarial system of justice) to provide the defense attorney with the proper incentives to bring forward any extenuating evidence needed to refute a false charge.
IV. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Robust Inference in Sequential Games.
In this section, we generalize the results in the previous section in two ways. First, we provide necessary conditions to clarify the role of the various assumptions made there. Second, we consider sequential games in general, rather than just the open forum. Our first result is perhaps unsurprising.
Proposition 4. In any sequential game (K, I), one-way disprovability is necessary for the existence of a robust inference rule for any class of preferences P containing at least one state indepen-
dent preference profile and, in particular, for P * . 14 Perhaps more surprising is that one-way disprovability is not necessary for separation per se. As a trivial example, suppose one sender is indifferent over all possible inferences by the receiver. Clearly, there is an equilibrium in which he tells the truth regardless of whether one-way disprovability holds. However, holding the receiver's inference rule fixed, this sender in general has many best replies. If some lead to incorrect inferences, then the inference rule is not robust. Later, we will also show that if the game itself is a choice variable, then one-way disprovability alone is sufficient for the existence of a game with a robust inference rule for P * .
Our next result is a characterization of robust inference rules for sequential games. This result is the key to much of our analysis.
Definition. δ is forcable in (K, I) if for every sender i, every state s, and every σ
In words, a forcable inference rule is one which allows any sender to "force" the inference to be correct given any strategies by the other senders. To see why forcability is necessary, suppose it does not hold. Intuitively, the other senders may then be able to "gang up" on sender i and prevent him from making s the inference even when s is the true state. Furthermore, there are preference profiles in P * I such that they would wish to do so. Hence an inference rule which is not forcable cannot be robust for P * I or P * . One particular way in which this could occur would be if some senders can be prevented from speaking altogether.
Proposition 5. δ is a robust inference rule for
Thus, the only games which permit robust inference are ones which are balanced in the sense of
Definition. A sequential game (K, I) is balanced if for every s, every h ∈ [M (s)] K such that F (h) is not a singleton, and every sender i, there is a subhistory h of h such that I(h ) = i.
That is, a game is balanced if every sender gets at least one chance to speak, regardless of what messages the other senders use.
Corollary 1. If a robust inference rule exists for P
Balanced games are a natural generalization of the open forums studied in Section III. There is also, as one might imagine, a close connection between forcable inference rules and BUR rules.
In the special case of an open forum, these notions are equivalent.
Proposition 6. If δ is a forcable inference rule for an open forum, then it is a BUR rule. If δ is a BUR rule, then it is forcable for any balanced sequential game.
Hence Propositions 5 and 6 provide the following restatement of Proposition 1 along with a partial converse:
Corollary 2. If δ is a degenerate BUR rule, then it is a robust inference rule for P * for any open forum. If δ is a robust inference rule for P * for an open forum, then it must be a BUR rule.

Note that Corollary 2 is a partial converse because it only establishes that a robust inference rule
for an open forum must be a BUR rule, not that it must be degenerate.
A forcable rule is not necessarily a BUR rule in balanced sequential games other than open forums for two reasons. First, in a balanced game a sender might send several messages without "yielding the floor." Second, a sender may get non-consecutive chances to speak. For example, after initially claiming a state he may later be asked to "back up" his claim if subsequently challenged by another sender. In such a game, robust inference may well involve disbelieving the initial claimeven if it is never explicitly refuted -if later the sender does not provide this "back up" evidence.
Although refutability ensures existence of a degenerate BUR rule, it can be relaxed to a condition which -if less straightforward to check -is both necessary and sufficient for such a rule to exist. To present this condition we use the following construction. For any s and any h with s ∈ F (h), let τ 1 (s | h) = M (s) and then recursively define
Recalling that F (h 0 ) = S, we define τ 
Definition. The message technology satisfies weak refutability if τ
* (s) = ∅ for all s.
Proposition 7. A degenerate BUR rule exists iff the message technology satisfies weak refutability.
Intuitively, τ k (s | h) describes the minimum amount of provability needed with a degenerate BUR rule to ensure that the k th speaker from the end can make a trustworthy claim of state s after a history h. 19 That is, using a message in We conclude by relating weak refutability to refutability. As the names suggest, the latter is stronger. Each condition enables us to meet a certain burden of proof which is sufficient to generate robust inference. The two burdens differ in two ways. First, the burden of proof that refutability allows -that is, requiring claims to be trustworthy -may require a sender to rule out certain states even though they have already been disproved by the messages of previous senders. The burden of proof associated with weak refutability makes no such requirement. In this regard, theburden associated with refutability is stricter. Second, though, the burden associated with weak refutability may require a sender to rule out a state in order to "help out" a later sender -that is, to enable a later sender to satisfy his burden of proof. 20 However, when refutability holds, this "help" is never needed. Thus whenever the burden of proof associated with refutability can be satisfied, the burden of proof associated with weak refutability can also be satisfied. That is,
Proposition 8. Refutability implies weak refutability.
V. Comments and Extensions.
Optimal Mechanisms.
Proposition 4 shows that one-way disprovability is necessary for any sequential game to have a robust inference rule for P * . More surprisingly, it is also true that given any message structure satisfying one-way disprovablity, there is always some game (K, I) for which a robust inference rule for P * exists. Thus if the game itself is a choice variable (as may be true for congressional hearings, trials, etc.) and if conflicting preferences and one-way disprovability hold, a decision maker can ensure robust inference.
We can also given an upper bound on the number of stages needed for robust inference. Let
Proposition 9. If one-way disprovability holds, there is a sequential game with n(L + 1) stages
for which a robust inference rule for P * exists.
To see the intuition, consider the following game. First, sender 1 is allowed to send any L + 1 messages, then sender 2 sends L + 1, etc., for a total of n(L + 1) stages. We again interpret the receiver's inference rule as if each sender attaches a "cheap talk" claim of a state with his set of messages. We extend the notion of trustworthiness to collections of messages by saying that a claim of s is weakly trustworthy if the L + 1 messages accompanying it rule out every s with
. Thus, if a false weakly trustworthy claim is on the table, it can clearly be refuted and the true state claimed in a weakly trustworthy fashion using no more than L + 1 messages.
Finally, it is easy to show that this inference rule is forcable and degenerate, so that it must be robust for P * .
In essence, this construction involves satisfying refutability with vectors of messages, rather 18 than single messages. Although these vectors may be long, we are not, however, creating a "back door" form of complete provability. Indeed, such a vector may well prove less than a full report would prove, since it only disproves "subset" states as well as any false claim on the table.
It is not difficult to derive tighter bounds on the number of stages. For example, the last sender does not really need to make his claim in a weakly trustworthy way since there are no later claims that he might block. Hence we can reduce the number of stages to (n − 1)(L + 1) + 1. Also, it may not always require the full L + 1 messages to refute an existing claim and make a new one in a weakly trustworthy way.
Nonetheless, the number of stages in this approach can still be quite large. Realistically, one of the most important restrictions on provability is precisely constraints on time -the receiver simply cannot listen to messages for a long period of time. Hence results with a relatively small number of stages seem to us more important. In particular, recall that Corollary 1 states that a robust inference rule exists for P * only if the game is balanced. Since balancedness requires that each sender have a turn to speak, the number of rounds of message sending K must at least equal the number of senders, n. Thus, our results on open forums, where K = n, can be seen as sufficient conditions for robust inference with the minimum possible number of stages to the game.
Robust Inference with More Information about Preferences.
To this point, all the receiver knows about the senders' preferences is that they satisfy conflicting preferences. If more is known, weak refutability may no longer be necessary for robust inference in an open forum. For example, suppose that he also knows that the first sender's preferences satisfy an ordered subset condition
It is not hard to show that for any message sets, such a preference order exists. With this additional knowledge, one-way disprovability becomes the only necessary and sufficient condition on provability for robust inference. Put differently, if the receiver has this additional information, robust inference is possible with only n stages if and only if one-way disprovability is satisfied. 
Robust Inference without Conflicting Preferences.
Robust inference with respect to all possible preference profiles is unachievable except under very stringent conditions. For example, if M (s) ⊂ M (s ) and all senders have s as their favorite inference in every state, then there is no separating equilibrium. To see this, suppose there were and let h be a history for which δ(h) = s. Since M (s) ⊂ M (s ), the history h must also be feasible in state s . It is not hard to see then that the only equilibrium outcome in the induced game in state s has s as the inference.
Conflicting preferences are not, however, necessary for robust inference. If the set of preference profiles P does not satisfy conflicting preferences but is sufficiently small, then robust inference with respect to P is still possible. On the other hand, it may require strong conditions. To illustrate this, we consider the polar opposite case to conflicting preferences -the case where all senders have identical preferences. To simplify further, we restrict attention to state independent preferences.
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Definition. The message sets satisfy ordered provability if we can number the states so that
In words, message sets satisfy ordered provability if we can number the states so that there is 20
an n-vector of messages feasible in state s 1 which proves that s 1 is the true state, an n-vector of messages feasible in s 2 which proves that either s 1 or s 2 is the true state, etc. Clearly, this is a very special structure. While it holds if provability is complete, it is not implied by either two-way disprovability or the full reports condition alone. Hence the following proposition indicates that robust inference is unlikely to be possible when all senders have identical preferences. In short, robust inference with identical state independent preferences is possible, but only under strong conditions on the message sets and only for relatively special sets of preferences.
VI. Conclusion.
This article has investigated the ability of an uninformed decision maker to elicit private information from self-interested parties. We find that with more than one speaker, conflicting preferences can lead to the revelation of a surprising amount of information -even with only very limited provability and with little information on the part of the decision maker about the speakers' preferences or strategies. Since even minimal amounts of provability may radically affect predicted outcomes, it is important to take account of communication with partial provability in models of economic and other decision making.
In many real-world settings, speakers may be asymmetrically informed. Our modeling choice of symmetric information is based on the view that the informational asymmetries between speakers and decision makers are typically more substantial than those among the speakers themselves 
To show the converse, suppose two-way disprovability and the full reports condition hold. 
s ∼i )) = s which is strictly better him. This contradicts the assumption thatσ s was an equilibrium in the induced game at state s. Hence there is no equilibrium in the induced game at s in which the receiver's inference differs from s. Since the induced game is a finite game of perfect information, there must be a pure strategy equilibrium.
Since every such equilibrium has the receiver inferring s, we see that δ is robust for P * . 
Proof of Proposition 6. The condition that δ be a BUR rule is nothing more than the translation of forcability for an open forum, implying the first statement. As to the second, suppose δ is a BUR rule. In any balanced sequential game, either the sequence of messages proves what the state is or else every sender has at least one turn to send a message. The fact that δ is a BUR rule implies that each sender can, at his turn, force the inference to be s if all other senders are restricted to strategies which are feasible in state s. This is precisely what forcability requires.
The proof of Proposition 7 uses the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For any h and h with F (h) ⊆ F (h ), for all k, and for all
s ∈ F (h), τ k (s | h ) ⊆ τ k (s | h).
Also, for all k, h, and s ∈
Proof of Lemma 1. Both statements are proved by induction. To show the first statement, note
, so the statement holds trivially for k = 1. So suppose we have demonstrated that the statement holds for k < j. We now show that it holds for k = j. So suppose
and, by the induction hypothesis,
To show the second statement, note that τ 2 (s | h) ⊆ M (s) = τ 1 (s | h), so that the statement holds trivially for k = 1. Suppose we have shown that the statement holds for k < j. We now
Proof of Proposition 7. First, suppose a BUR rule exists. Fix any feasible history h 1 up to the last message to be sent -that is, with K − 1 messages. Suppose F (h 1 ) is not a singleton. Then by the definition of BUR:
Note also that this property holds trivially if F (h 1 ) is a singleton.
Now consider any feasible history h 2 up to the next to last round -that is, a history with
As before, if F (h 2 ) is a singleton, this property holds trivially.
We claim that for every h 2 with K − 2 messages and every is not a singleton. Suppose
Given this, BUR requires that for every h 2 with K −2 messages and every
must be nonempty. Otherwise, it is impossible to find m s,h 2 satisfying (A2) and allowing (A1) to be satisfied.
From here, the rest of the necessity proof is by induction. Fix any feasible history h j with exactly K − j messages, so there are j rounds left counting this turn. By BUR,
Suppose that we have shown for j ≤ k − 1 that for every feasible h j with K − j messages, each
(This is what we have shown for k = 2.)
We now show that the same must hold for j = k.
Suppose that for some history h k with K − k messages, there is a state s ∈ F (h k ) such that the 
, for all k, all h, and all s ∈ F (h). Hence τ * (s) = ∅ for all s implies τ k (s | h) = ∅ for all k, all h, and all s ∈ F (h).
Next, suppose that m ∈ τ k (s | h) and m has the same pure information content as m -i.e.,
By the first statement of Lemma 1, we also have
We next claim that our rich language condition, #{m | F (m ) = F (m)} ≥ #F (m), implies that: Proof of Lemma 2. We demonstrate both statements by the following algorithm.
Lemma 2. For any feasible h with K −k messages, there exists a set of messages {m
Step 1: Fix any s 1 ∈ F (h) (or Step 2: LetŜ 1 denote the set of s ∈ F (h), s = s 1 (and s = s for the second statement), such that (4) . Given these objects, we define an appropriate H * k and ξ k and then sets of messages for each feasible history with k messages if k ≤ K − 1. 
